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WHEN A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF lAND IS
EXECUTED PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF A SUIT
INVOLVING THE PROPERTYS TITLE, LIS PENDENS MAY
BE PRECLUDED FROM AFFECTING THE PURCHASER'S
INTEREST UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION. DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 659 A.2d
300 (1995).
I.

INTRODUCTION

A court decree awarding an interest in property does not necessarily result in legal title being conveyed to the prevailing party. A
third-party purchaser may have an interest in the property that is
superior, preventing the execution of the decree. The application
of two conflicting doctrines, one that protects a third-party purchaser and one that protects a litigant's property interest, will determine legal title of the contested property.
Equitable conversion protects a bona fide purchaser's interest
in many situations.! The doctrine of lis pendenSl prevents a property
interest from being alienated to the detriment of the litigating parties during pendency of a suit. 3 Generally, one must be a party to
an action to be bound by a judgment or decree. 4 However, an interest in property acquired by a third-party purchaser, while litigation
affecting its title is pending, is subject to the result of that
1. See infra notes 3546 and accompanying text.
2. "Lis pendens literally means a pending action." Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Taro,
71 Md. App. 489, 493, 526 A2d 611, 612 (1987) (quoting Angelos v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 38 Md. App. 265, 268, 380 A2d 646, 648 (1977», ecrt. granted, 311
Md. 193, 533 A2d 670 (1987). Lis pendens is the control that a court acquires
over property involved in a suit until final judgment. See 54 CJ.S. Lis Pendens
§ 2, at 393 (1987). A pendente lite purchaser is one who purchases property
during the pendency of a suit in which the rights of the property are being
litigated. See 8 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAw OF
REAL PROPERTY § 4308 (1963). Black's Law Dictionary defines pendente lite nihil
innovetuT as, "[ d] uring a litigation nothing new should be introduced."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
4. See Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md. 317, 320 (1866) (citing JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 400 (6th ed. 1853».
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litigation. 5
A question of law arises when an executory contract for sale
has been entered into prior to the filing of an action giving constructive notice of lis pendens, but the conveyance is subsequent.
One legal maxim provides that "when there are competing equities,
one of which was acquired pre-litigation, it is the pre~xisting equity
that prevails."6
In DeShields v. Broadwater,? the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that this maxim is applicable when the doctrine of equitable
conversion competes with the doctrine of lis pendens. s The court determined that parties may be bound by a judicial decree which involved lis pendens. 9 With the DeShields decision, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland joined the majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue, holding that a property interest created by an executory contract, executed prior to the filing of a pleading, is unaffected by a
judgment of the subsequently filed action.1O
II. BACKGROUND
Lis pendens and equitable conversion are doctrines that have
common law origins. ll Today, lis pendens has been codified in all but
5. See DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 433, 659 A.2d 300, 305 (1995). "Ordinarily, it is true, that the decree of a court binds only the parties and their
privies in representation or estate, but he who purchases during pendency of
a suit is held bound by the decree made against the person from whom he
derives title . . . . " Applegarth, 25 Md. at 320 (quoting STORY, supra note 4,
§ 400).
6. DeShields, 338 Md. at 44142, 659 A.2d at 309 (citing Himmighoefer v. Medallion Indus., 302 Md. 270, 281, 487 A.2d 282, 287-88 (1984». "A still more accurate statement is that as between persons having only equitable interests, if
their interests are in all other respects equal, priority in time gives a better equity." 30A CJ.S. Equity § 127 (1992).
7. 338 Md. 422, 659 A.2d 300 (1995).
8. See id. at 441, 659 A.2d at 309. An action involving lis pendens will not have priority over an equitable interest acquired for valuable consideration prior to
the filing of suit. See id.
9. See id. at 44142, 659 A.2d at 309.
10. See id. at 442, 659 A.2d at 309.
11. See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 18 S.E.2d 436, 438 (N.C. 1942).
The law of lis pendens stems back to the Roman law where the rule
was "a thing concerning which there is a controversy is prohibited
during suit, from being alienated." The same rule was formulated
and adopted by Lord Bacon, thereafter becoming firmly fixed in the
English law, inherited by us as part of the common law.
[d.
Equitable conversion principles developed in the English Court of Chancery

1997]

DeShields v. Broadwater

629

four states 12 and is recognized in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. 13 Equitable conversion is recognized in forty-seven states
beginning in the early seventeenth century. 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§ 11.22 (AJ. Casner ed., 1952). Equitable conversion is based on the theory
that equity treats that as being done which should have been done. See THOMP·
SON, supra note 2, § 4447. Therefore, when the vendee contracts to buy and
the vendor to sell, in equity the vendee becomes the owner of the land, and
the vendor the owner of the purchase money. See id.
12. The District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Vermont do
not have lis prndens statutes.
13. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-4-130 to -139 (1975 & Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.45.840 to .940 (Michie 1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1191 (West 1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16--59-101 to -107 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 405.20 to 405.60 (Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-35-110
(1990 & Supp.1995); COLO. R CIV. PRO. CODE 105(f) (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52-325 to -326 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§§ 25-1601 to -1614 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.23 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-610 to -613 (1982 & Supp. 1995); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 634-51 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 5-505 (1990 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
30, para. 121 (1969 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-4-1 to -8 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 617.11 to .15 (West 1950 & Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2201 (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 382- 440
(Banks-Baldwin 1993); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3751-3753 (West 1961 &
Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184, § 15 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995);
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 600.2701 to .2731 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 557.020 to .021 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 11-47-1 to -15 (1972 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 527.260 (West 1953 &
Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-102 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-531
(1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.010 to .017 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995);
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-6 to :15-17 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-1-14 to -15 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.Y C.P.L.R 6501-6515 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1·116 to -120.2 (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 28-05-07 to -09 (1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2703.26 to .27,
5309.58 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.2 (West 1993); OR. REv.
STAT. § 93.740 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302 (1981 & Supp. 1995);
RI. GEN. LAws § 9-4-9 (1985 & Supp. 1996); S.c. CODE ANN. § 15-11-10 to -50
(Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 15-10-1 to -11
(Michie 1984 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-101 to -105 (1994); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12.007 to .008 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-40-2 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-268 to - 269 (Michie 1992);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.28.320 to .325 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); W. VA.
CODE §§ 55-11-1 to -3 (1994 & Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 840.10 (West
1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-6--106 to -109 (Michie 1988). Some of these stat·utes merely codify the state's common law lis prndens doctrine. See, e.g., ALAsKA
STAT. §§ 09.45.840 to .940 (1994). Others modify the common law, but do not
abrogate it. See, e.g., Stark Piano Co. v. Fanin, 279 S.W. 1080 (Ky. 1926). Other
state's statutes expressly repeal the common law doctrine of lis prndrns. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 1614 (1989).
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and the District of Columbia. 14 Maryland is one of four states that
does not have a lis pendens statute, but Maryland does recognize the
common law doctrines of both lis pendens and equitable

14. See Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); see also Grass v. Ward,
451 So. 2d 803 (Ala. 1984); Currington v. Johnson, 685 P.2d73 (Alaska 1984);
Passey v. Great W. Ass'n, 850 P.2d 133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Smith v. MRCC
Partnership, 792 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1990); Rogers v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710
(Ct. App. 1994); Konecny v. Gunten, 379 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1963); Fidelity Trust
Co. v.· BVD Assoc., 492 A.2d 180 (Conn. 1985); Briz-Ier Corp. v. Weiner, 171
A.2d 65 (Del. 1961); Gustin v. Stegall, 347 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1975); Munshower v.
Martin, 641 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Simmons v. Krall, 412 S.E.2d
559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Bank of Hawaii v. Horwoth, 787 P.2d'674 (Haw.
1990); Holscher v. James, 860 P.2d 646 (Idaho 1993); Farmer's State Bank v.
Neese, 665 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990); Frisbie v. Director of Taxation for the Dep't of Revenue, 566
P.2d 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Tatman v. Cook's ADM'X, 195 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1946); Bakery v. Commissioner of Corp. & Taxation, 140 N.E. 593 (Mass.
1925); Brooks v. Gillow, 89 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1958); Frederick v. Peoples
Bank of Madison Lake, 385 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Tinsley v. State
Tax Comm., 235 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1970); In re King, 572 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Sharbono v. Darden, 715 P.2d 433 (Mont. 1986); Father Flanagan's
Boys' Home v. Graybill, 132 N.W.2d 304 (Neb. 1964); Herndon v. Gritz, 920
P.2d 998 (Nev. 1996); In re Jesseman, 429 A.2d 1036 (N.H. 1981); Jacobs v.
Great Pac. Century Corp., 484 A.2d 1312 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984);
Frietze v. Frietze, 437 P.2d 137 (N.M. 1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 490 N.Y.S.2d
324 (N.Y. 1985); Green v. Gustafson, 482 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1992); Sanford v.
Breidenbach, 173 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); First Mustang State Bank
v. Garland Bloodworth Inc., 825 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1991); Security Bank v.
Chiapuzio, 747 P.2d 335 (Or. 1987); Partrick & Wilkins Co. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 456 A.2d 1348 (Pa. 1983); Grant v. Briskin, 603 A.2d 324 (R.1. 1992);
Brooks v. Counsel of Co-Owners of Stones Throw Property Regime I, 445
S.E.2d 630 (S.C. 1994); Schlosser v. Norwest Bank of South Dakota, 506
N.W.2d 416 (S.D. 1993); Campbell v. Miller, 562 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1977); Parson v. Wolfe, 676 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Lach v. Deseret
Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); City of Manassas v. Board of County
Supervisors, 458 S.E.2d 568 (Va. 1995); Tate v. Wood, 289 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va.
1982); Carefree Homes, Inc. v. Production Credit Ass'n, 260 N.W.2d 759 (Wis.
1978); W.A. Moncrief v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 500
(Wyo. 1993). Louisiana, Maine, and Vermont have not recognized the doctrine of equitable conversion; however, they will enforce a land sale contract
with a decree of specific performance. See Brown v. Ardoin, 663 So. 2d 194
(La. Ct. App. 1995); Pederson v. Cole, 501 A.2d 23 (Me. 1985); First Nat'l
Bank v. Laperle, 86 A.2d 635 (Vt. 1952). Only Washington explicitly rejects the
doctrine of equitable conversion. See Estate of Phillips v. Nyhus, 874 P.2d 154,
159 (Wash. 1994) (stating affirmatively that Washington does not recognize
the doctrine of equitable conversion).
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conversion. 15
The doctrines of equitable conversion and lis pendens affect
property interests. Lis pendens provides constructive notice to all prospective purchasers of propertyl6 that any interest acquired in that
property is subject to the outcome of the SUit. 17 Alternatively, equitable conversion converts the buyer's interest into equitable interest
and the seller's interest into a legal interest,18 thereby allocating certain rights to each party.19 When an executory contract for sale is
entered into prior to the filing of an action giving rise to lis pendens,
these two equitable doctrines collide.
A.

Lis Pendens

The doctrine of lis pendens was founded upon the public policy
of preventing alienation or encumbrance of title during the progress of a suit in order to prevent endless litigation. 2o Lis pendens is
applicable only when the object of the proceeding is the title of the
property in question 21 and applies throughout the appeals process. 22
15. See MD. RULE 12-102 (recognizing the doctrine of lis pendens); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 396, 153 A. 445, 447 (1931) (recognizing the doctrine of equitable conversion).
16. See Lee v. Silva, 240 P. 1015, 1018 (Cal. 1925); Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md.
317, 320 (1866); see also infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Angelos v. Maryland Cas. Co., 38 Md. App. 265, 268, 380 A.2d 646,
648 (1977).
.
18. See Motels of Md., Inc. v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306, 313-14, 223 A.2d
609, 613 (1966) (stating that "equity treats a contract of sale of real estate as
transferring an equitable estate or interest to the vendee, leaving the vendor
the holder of the bare legal title"); Newport Terminals, Inc. v. Sunset Terminals, Inc., 566 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Or. 1977).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 4346.
20. See Inloes v. Harvey, 11 Md. 519 (1857); see also Moore v. Zelic, 170 N.E. 664,
666 (Ill. 1930) (stating that" [t]he doctrine of lis pendens is based on the questions of public policy and convenience as necessary to the administration of
justice, in order that decisions in pending suits may be binding and given full
effect and that an end be had to litigation").
21. See Angelos, 38 Md. App. at 268, 380 A.2d at 648. Lis pendens applies only in a
proceeding directly relating to the property in question. See Feigley v. Feigley,
7 Md. 537, 564 (1855). To invoke the doctrine of lis pendens, the property described must be at the very essence of controversy between the litigants. See
Katz v. Banning, 617 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). "A few states, however, provide that a lis pendens is available if the litigation affects personalty as
well." Janice Gregg Levy, Lis Pendens And Procedural Due Process: A Closer Look
After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 MD. L. REv. 1054, 1058 (1992). Generally, the
property must be of a character subject to the rule, the court must have jurisdiction of the person and the res, and the property must be sufficiently de-
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It operates only against real or leasehold property that is located in
the state in which the action is pending. 23 It is unavailable in actions
that seek to recover money damages prior to securing a lien upon
property subject to lis pendens. 24 In Maryland, all purchasers are
deemed to have constructive notice after the complaint is filed. 25
Additionally, lis pendens has been held to be proper in, but not limited to, proceedings such as the following: an action for specific
performance of a contract of sale;26 an action to enforce a lien,
charge, or encumbrance against property;27 divorce proceedings involving marital property;28 injunctive relief regarding use of subject
property;29 and condemnation proceedings against subject

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

scribed in the pleading or the place of recording to enable purchasers to ascertain the identity of the property. See 54 CJ.S. Lis Pendens §§ 7-9 (1987).
Lis pendens carries over to appeal because "[a]n appeal is usually held to be a
continuation of the action, and not a new action, and one who knows of the
pendency of the suit and the rendition of the judgment is presumed to know
that an appeal may be taken from the judgment within the time prescribed by
law." Golden v. Riverside Coal & Timber Co., 211 S.w. 761, 763-64 (Ky. 1919);
see Perry Park Country Club, Inc. v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 813 P.2d 841, 844
(Colo. 1991); Srager v. Koenig, 651 A.2d 752, 754 (Conn. App. 1994); 54 CJ.S.
Lis Pendens § 23 (1987). Lis pendens also has been held to continue pending a
rehearing awarded on appeal. See West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Cooper,
106 S.E. 55, 60 (w. Va. 1921).
See Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Taro, 71 Md. App. 489, 495, 526 A.2d 611, 613
(1987), cert. granted, 311 Md. 193, 533 A.2d 670 (1987); see also Rickey Land &
Catde ·Co. v. Miller, 218 U.S. 258 (1987).
See Warfel v. Brady, 95 Md. App. 1,8,619 A.2d 171, 174 (1993); see also Tanner
v. Wilson, 192 S.E. 425, 427-28 (Ga. 1937); Moore v. Zelie, 170 N.E. 664, 666-67
(Ill. 1930); W.H. Hopper & Assoc., Inc. v. Dunaway, 396 So. 2d 43, 44 (Miss.
1981) .
See MD. RULE 12-102; see also Applegarth, 25 Md. at 328. When the property is
located in a different county other than where the action is pending, a certified copy of the complaint must be filed in the county in whieh the property
is located. See MD. RULE 12-102. Cases pending in United States district courts
have lis pendens effect without filing in local circuit court. Cf Permanent Fin.
Corp., 71 Md. App. at 494, 526 A.2d at 613.
See Marr v. Bradley, 59 N.W.2d 331, 332-33 (Minn. 1953) (holding that lis
pendens binds a subsequent purchaser even though expensive improvements
were made to the property).
See Ballard v. Lawyers Tide of Ariz., 552 P.2d 455, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976)
(stating that a purchaser who enters into a contract for sale during the pendency of a suit to foreclose a mechanics lien is bound by the judgment).
See Moore, 170 N.E. at 666-67; Lombardo v. Gerard, 592 N.E.2d 1333, 1334
(Mass. 1992).
See J. PAUL RIEGER, JR., EXAMINING nTLES TO REAL ESTATE IN MARYLAND 23-24
(1995).

1997]

DeShields v. Broadwater

633

property.30
Lis pendens does not prevent alienation; it only places a cloud
on the property titleY This result can lead to harsh consequences
because it may be difficult for a prospective purchaser to find out if
the title is clouded. 32 To remedy this problem, some states have enacted rules that require the notice to be recorded. 33 Maryland does
not have such a statute and makes reference to lis pendens only in
30. See id.
31. See Applegarth, 25 Md. at 327. Lis pendens also has a chilling effect on the alienability of property that is the object of the suit. See DeShieUls, 338 Md. at 434,
659 A.2d at 305-D6. Some states have held that if the operation of lis pendens
proves harsh or arbitrary in some particular instance, equity can and should
refuse to give it effect. See, e.g., White v. Wensaur, 702 P.2d 15, 18 (Okla. 1985)
(holding that if the defendant's property was in imminent danger of being
foreclosed upon, lis pendens should be released so that the property could be
sold). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that "it is essential that the
court, when called upon to act on a motion to discharge lis pendens, take testimony to ascertain the exact nature and extent of any possible prejudice that
could result from the release of notice and whenever appropriate, safeguard
the threatened rights by other available means less drastic in character." [d.,
at 18-19.
32. See Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Taro, 71 Md. App. 489, 492, 526 A.2d 611, 612
(1987).
Many of the effects of common law lis pendens were as harsh as the
inequities the rule sought to avoid. Because all that was required of a
litigant who wished to bind land was that he file a suit concerning
the land, often a reasonable search and diligent search by a prospective purchaser would not reveal the existence if litigation affecting title, or would reveal litigation whose object would remain unknown to.
the searcher.
Thomas Stone Marrion, Connecticut's Lis Pendens Shapes Up, 16 CONN. L. REv.
413, 414 (1984).
33. See MD. RULE 12-102; 54 CJ.S. Lis Pendens § 14 (1987). "Some states make the
filing of a notice in accordance with their terms a prerequisite to the commencement or existence of lis pendens." [d.; see also Jones v. Ainell, 186 S.W. 65,
66 (Ark. 1916) (" [A] suit affecting the title or any lien on real estate is not lis
pendens until notice of the pendency of the action is filed in accordance with
the statute."). Colorado's lis pendens rule provides:
Only after filing a pleading wherein the affirmative relief is claimed
affecting the title to real property, a party may record in the office of
the clerk and recorder of the county in which the property is situated a notice of lis pendens containing the names of the parties, the
nature of the claims, and a legal description of the property in that
county affected thereby; such notice shall from the time of recording
thereof, and only from such time, be constructive notice to all persons acquiring an interest . . . .
COLO. R CN. P. 105(£)(1) (1989) (emphasis added).
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the Maryland Rules of Court. 34

B.

Equitable Conversion

Equitable conversion 35 occurs when a buyer and seller enter
into an executory contract of sale that equity would specifically enforce. 36 An executory contract of sale is one which may be valid and
bin dingY In order for equitable conversion to occur, the contract
must be free from equitable imperfections and enforceable against
the purchaser and the vendor in an action for specific performance. 38 If the contract is bona fide and made for valuable consideration, the conversion occurs when the contract is executed. 39
To be bona fide, the purchaser must not have constructive or
actual notice of another equitable interest in the property.40 If the
suit is filed after the contract for sale is entered into, then the purchaser could not have had constructive notice created by lis
34. See MD. RULE 12-102. In Maryland, lis pendens operates much like the commonlaw doctrine. See Levy, supra note 21, at 1087.
35. In Motels of Md., Inc. v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306, 223 A.2d 609 (1966),
the court of appeals addressed the doctrine of equitable conversion and
noted:
That equity treats a contract of sale of real estate as transferring an
equitable estate or interest to the vendee, leaving the vendor the
holder of bare legal title, is firmly established in Maryland .... It is
equally firmly established of course that equity ordinarily will transform the equitable interest of a vendee into a legal estate by granting
specific performance of the contract to sell and convey.
Id. at 313-14, 223 A.2d at 613.
36. See Harlan F. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 371
(1913). A contract that equity would specifically enforce is one which the vendee has the right to compel specific performance under the maxim "that equity regards that as being done which ought to be done." Orville P. Cockerill,
Equitable Conversion In California, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 309, 310 (1928).
37. See Coe v. Hays, 328 Md. 350, 358, 614 A.2d 576, 580 (1992) (citing Birckner v.
Tilch, 179 Md. 314, 323, 18 A.2d 222, 226 (1941».
38. See id. "[E]quitable conversion is applicable only when there is a specifically
enforceable contract between the parties, and the changes in the rights, duties, powers and liabilities of the parties which result from the making of the
contract consequences of the equitable right to specific performance." 3
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 11.22.
39. See Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 396, 153 A. 445, 447 (1931). Where property passes under a contract of sale, conversion operates from the time of the
execution of the instrument, unless the parties agree that the conversion will
not take place until a later date. See id.
40. See Coe, 328 Md. at 358, 614 A.2d at 580.
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pendens. 41 If the purchaser had no knowledge of the plaintiff's interest in the property or intention to bring suit involving title to the
property, the purchaser is without actual knowledge. 42
Similar to lis pendens, equitable conversion creates an equitable
interest in property by allocating each party's interest and, in some
circumstances, making the purchaser's interest superior to the vendor's interest. 43 For instance, equitable conversion protects a purchaser's interest created by a contract for sale from a vendor's conveyance to a third party during the contract's executory period. 44 In
addition, it protects a purchaser's interest from imposition of a
mechanic's lien against the vendor during the same period. 45 Equitable conversion has also been applied to bar the execution of a restrictive covenant after the contract has been entered into.46
C.

Purchase Occurring Prior to Lis Pendens

The prevailing rule is that by the virtue of equitable conversion, lis pendens will not affect a purchaser's interest if an executory
contract of sale is entered into prior to the filing of an action. 47 Numerous cases from different jurisdictions have followed this rule as
early as the nineteenth century.48 The rationale is that the equitable
interests created through equitable conversion and lis pendens are
equa1. 49 Furthermore, when two equal competing equities exist, the
41. See, e.g., Roberts v. Friedell, 15 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. 1944).
42. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

43. "[T]he doctrine is invoked in allocating the benefits and burdens incident to
property .... " 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPER'IY, supra note 11, § 11.22.
44. See In re Estate of Clark, 447 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa App. 1989).
45. See Himmighoefer v. Medallion Indus., Inc., 302 Md. 270, 280, 487 A.2d 282,
287-88 (1985).
46. See DeBoer v. Oakbrook Home Ass'n, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 768 (Neb. 1984).
47. See Dodge v. Clark, 268 F. 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1920); Lee v. Silva, 240 P. 1015,
1018 (Cal. 1925); Golden v. Riverside Coal & Timber Co., 211 S.W. 761, 763-64
(Ky. 1919); Parks v. Smoot's Adm'rs, 48 S.w. 146, 147-48 (Ky. 1898); Meyering
v. Russell, 220 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
224 N.W.2d 280 (Mich. 1974); Roberts v. Friedell, 15 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn.
1944); Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1966); Abington v. O'Dell,
197 S.W. 339, 340 (Mo. 1917); Bristow v. Thackston, 86 S.W. 94, 99 (Mo. 1905);
Star v. Norsteby, 30 N.W.2d 718, 720 (N.D. 1948); Walker v. Goldsmith, 12 P.
537,542 (Or. 1886); Perszyk v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 254 N.W. 753,
756 (Wis. 1934).
48. See E.W.H., Doctrine of Lis Pendens as Applied Against One Who Takes Deed Pending
Action Pursuant to Executory Contract Entered Into Before Action Commenced, 93
A.L.R 404 (1934).
49. See DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 441, 659 A.2d 300, 309 (1995).
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one first in time will prevaiPo This leads to the conclusion that the
interest created by equitable conversion will be superior to the subsequent interest created by lis pendens.
The party filing an action giving rise to lis pendens has three options if a contract of sale was entered into prior to the filing of a
lawsuit. 51 First, the party may make the' purchaser a party to the suit,
thereby binding the purchaser to the court's decision. 52 Second, the
filing party may argue that the purchaser had actual knowledge of
the adverse claim and is, therefore, a mala fide purchaser not entitled to protection from lis pendens. 53 Third, the party can argue that
the purchaser had not paid any consideration, or only a portion of
the purchase price, prior to the filing of the action 54-although this
argument, by itself, is probably not sufficient to bind the
purchaser. 55
Generally, a judgment or decree in an action will not bind any
person who is not a party to that action. 56 The rule is based upon
the omitted party's due process right to be heard.57 An exception to
this rule applies when the omitted third-party stands in privity to
one who is properly made a party to the action. 58 However, one who
acquires property rights through an executory contract prior to the
commencement of an action is not in privity with the vendor.59
Therefore, a purchaser with an equitable interest created by an executory contract prior to the suit involving title will not be bound
by the court's decree unless the purchaser is made a party to the
suit. 60 Indeed, a plaintiff with actual knowledge of the purchaser will
find little sympathy from the court if the purchaser is not made a
50. See Walker v. Goldsmith, 17 P. 537, 538 (Or. 1888); see also Himmighoefer v.
Medallion Indus., Inc., 302 Md. 270, 272, 487 A2d 282, 284 (1984); Newport
Terminals, Inc. v. Sunset Terminals, Inc., 566 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Or. 1977).
51. See, e.g., Meyering, 220 N.W.2d at 125.
52. See, e.g., id.; Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1966).
53. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
55. See Meyering, 220 N.W.2d at 125.
56. See Roberts v. Friedell, 15 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. 1944). "In order to make
such judgment or decree binding, the rights of the party sought to be bound
must have accrued subsequent to the commencement of the action." Id.
57. Cf. id. at 499; Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 151 A2d 546, 551 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959) (stating that it would be a violation of due process to deprive a
party of property rights when he was a stranger to the action).
58. See Roberts, 15 N.W.2d at 499.
59. See id. (citing Dull v. Blackman, 169 U.S. 243, 248 (1898».
60. See Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1966).
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party to the suit. 61 Likewise, a purchaser's interest may be subject to
the decree of the court if he had actual knowledge of another
party's interest before he obtained his interest in the land, or if he
knew that a suit was intended but not yet filed. 62
Finally, the fact that the purchaser paid nominal or no consideration before the action was filed carries little weight with the
court. 63 In fact, it has been rejected by many jurisdictions,64 but applied primarily in conjunction with other factors adverse to the purchaser.65 For example, in Siedschlag v. Grifjin,66 although a contract
was executed nineteen days before the action was filed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the purchaser was still bound by lis
pendens. 67 The court stated that the consideration, if paid at all, was
paid after the purchaser knew of the fraudulent nature of the deed
held by the vendor. 68 Additionally, the purchaser had not received
61. See, e.g., Rnberts, 15 N.W.2d at 499 (stating that the plaintiff knew that the purchaser was in possession and was deliberately omitted as a party, therefore, the
judgment was not binding upon him); Abingdon v. O'Dell, 197 S.W. 339, 340
(Mo. 1917) (stating that there was no excuse for not making the purchaser a
party particularly because the purchaser was in possession).
62. See In re Justice, 418 F.2d 1162, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (recognizing lis pendens
does not apply against one who had actual notice of a suit or petition);
Golden v. Riverside Coal & Timber Co., 211 S.W. 761, 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1919)
(stating that a purchaser with actual knowledge holds the property without
any more rights than his vendor to the extent that his purchase affects the
rights of the successful litigant); Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah
1982); see also Rnberts, 15 N.W.2d at 499.
63. See grnerally DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 445-46, 659 A.2d 300, 311-12
(1995). However, some jurisdictions have held a purchaser pendente lite if the
purchaser originally bought without notice but subsequently was notified of an
infirmity in the title before paying any consideration. See Watts v. Noble, 262
S.W. 1114, 1116 (Ky. 1924).
64. See Dodge v. Clark, 268 F. 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1920); Lee v. Silva, 240 P. 1015,
1018-19 (Cal. 1925); Golden, 211 S.W. at 764; Parks v. Smoot's Adm'rs, 48 S.w.
146, 147-48 (Ky. 1898); Meyering v. Russell, 220 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 224 N.W.2d 280 (Mich. 1974); Rnberts, 15
N.W.2d at 499; Tinnon, 408 S.W. at 103; Abingdon v. O'Dell, 197 S.W. 339, 340
(Mo. 1917); Bristow v. Thackston, 86 S.w. 94, 99 (Mo. 1905); Star v. Norsteby,
30 N.W.2d 718, 720 (N.D. 1948); Walker v. Goldsmith, 17 P. 537, 542 (Or.
1886); Perszyk v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 254 N.W. 753, 756 (Wis.
1934).
65. See infra notes 7~0 and accompanying text.
66. 112 N.W. 18 (Wis. 1907).
67. See id. at 18, 20-21.
68. See id. at 18, 20. The deed was fraudulent because the description of the land
was inadequate. See id.
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or recorded the deed prior to the filing of the action. 69
In Lightle v. Schmidt,7° the Supreme Court of Arkansas noted
that a purchaser had not paid any part of the purchase money and
held that the purchaser was bound by the judgment entered against
the vendor.71 Moreover, the court noted the contract was oral and
that the purchaser had not taken possession.72
. Finally, in Fisher v. Shropshire,73 the Supreme Court dealt with a
suit to enforce a vendor's lien where the contract was oral, all of
the purchase money had not been paid prior to the filing of the lis
pendens, and the conveyance occurred after the lis pendens was
filed. 74 Although the equitable rights under the contract of sale
arose before the equitable rights created by the vendor's lien, the
court held that the vendor's lien was a superior right. 7s Additionally,
the court held that the purchaser was protected for the amount
paid under the contract of sale before the suit involving a vendor's
lien was filed because the purchaser's rights were not affected. 76
In contrast to Shropshire, where a statute resolved the issue, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in DeShields v. Broadwater,77 relied on
common law, opinions from other jurisdictions,78 and Himmighoefer
69. See id. A Wisconsin statute at the time of this case provided that "every purchaser or encumbrancer whose conveyance or incumbrance is not recorded
or filed shall be deemed a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer and shall
be bound by the proceedings in the action to the same extent and in the
same manner as if he were made a party thereto." [d. at 20-21.
70. 222 S.W 46 (Ark. 1920).
71. See id. at 47.
72. See id. at 4647. In essence, the court held that the contract entered into prior
to the filing of the suit by a third party was not a binding contract of sale and,
thus, would not invoke the doctrine of equitable conversion. See id. at 47.
73. 147 U.S. 133 (1892) (applying Iowa law in a diversity case).
74. See id. at 142.
75. See id. at 140 (stating that a vendor's lien in Iowa is granted according to equitable principles).
76. See id.
77. 338 Md. 422, 659 A.2d 300 (1995).
78. See id. at 44243, 659 A.2d at 309-10 (citing Patton v. Darden, 148 So. 806, 808
(Ala. 1933); Rooney v. Michael, 4 So. 421, 423 (Ala. 1888); Lee v. Silva, 240 P.
1015, 1018 (Cal. 1925); Marshall v. Charland, 31 S.E. 791, 791 (Ga. 1898);
Bowen v. Jameson, 4 S.W2d 401, 403 (Ky. 1898); Parks v. Smoot's Adm'rs, 48
S.W. 147, 147 (Ky. 1898); Roberts v. Friedell, 15 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. 1944);
Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1966); Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 151
A.2d 546, 551 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ap. Div. 1959); Star v. Norsteby, 30 N.W2d 718,
720 (N.D. 1948); Young's Adm'r v. McClung, 50 Va. 336 (1852); West Virginia
Pulp &Paper Co. v. Cooper, 106 S.E. 55, 59 (WV. 1921); Perszk v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 254 N.W 753, 755-56 (Wis. 1934».
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v. Medallion Industries. 79 HimmighoeJer was a Maryland case in which
the court of appeals held that when competing equities exist, one
of which was acquired prior to litigation, it is the pre-existing equity
that prevails. 80
In DeShields, the Court of Appeals of Maryland joined the majority of jurisdictions that had addressed the issue concerning which
interest is superior when a pre-existing equitable right created by
equitable conversion competes with a subsequent interest created by
lis pendens. 8l The court held that a property interest created by an
executory contract executed prior to the filing of a pleading is unaffected by the judgment of the subsequently filed action. 82 In other
words, property that is purchased prior tq litigation is not affected
by lis pendens because of equitable conversion.

III.

INSTANT CASE

At issue in DeShields was commercial property located at 5361
Sheriff Road, Prince George's County, Maryland. 83 On March 23,
1984, Phunlop and Chitra Sriuthai (the Sriuthais) purchased Jack's
Liquors, Inc., (Jack's) from Shirley DeShields (DeShields) .84 Thirteen months later, the Sriuthais purchased the property on which
Jack's was situated. 8s In 1986, DeShields sued the Sriuthais for
breach of contract arising out of the sale of Jack's and subsequently
gained control over the business. 86 A settlement agreement gave
DeShields, who was acting as chief executive officer of Jack's, control over the corporate affairs of the business, with an agreement
that she pay rent to the Sriuthais over ~e next five years with an
option to renew. 87
On January 30, 1989, the Sriuthais contracted to sell the Sheriff
Road property to Tommy Broadwater, Jr. (Broadwater) .88 Jack's con79. 302 Md. 270, 487 A.2d 282 (1984).
80. See id. at 274, 487 A.2d at 284. "In [Himmighoejer], the equitable interest obtained by contract purchasers from the builder of a subdivision were held to
be superior to mechanics liens judicially entered after the contracts of sale
were made but before deeds to the purchasers were executed, acknowledged,
and recorded." DeShields, 338 Md. at 442, 659 A.2d at 309.
81. See DeShields, 338 Md. at 442, 659 A.2d at 309.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 428, 659 A.2d at 303.
84. See id. at 428-29, 659 A.2d at 303.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 430, 659 A.2d at 30~4.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 429, 659 A.2d at 303. The purchase price was $135,000, and Broadwa-

640

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

tinued to operate on the property.89 On March 28, 1989, Jack's
brought suit for constructive trust and damages against the Sriuthais, asking the court to convey the title of the Sheriff Road property from the Sriuthais to Jack's.90 Broadwater was not named in the
action; however, he did file a motion to intervene that was subsequently denied. 91 Judgment was entered against the Sriuthais on
April 17, 1991.92 Jack's attorney was appointed trustee to convey, by
quitclaim deed, the Sriuthais' interest in the property.93 Broadwater,
however, claiming to be the owner of the property, failed in his attempt to negotiate a lease agreement with Jack's and filed a complaint against DeShields for possession of the property due to nonpayment of rent. 94
Jack's action against the Sriuthais for a constructive trust on the
property was consolidated with Broadwater's action against
DeShields for possession of the property.95 DeShields and Jack's96
contended that under the doctrine of lis pendens the purchaser is
bound by the judgment in a pending constructive trust suit. 97
DeShields argued that the Sheriff Road property was sold after the
constructive trust suit was commenced. 98 She argued further that
under lis pendens, the purchaser would be bound by the judgment
in the constructive trust action. 99
The Circuit Court for Prince George's County held that the
property was purchased before the constructive trust suit was initiated and, by virtue of equitable conversion, was not affected by the
outcome of that suit.loo On its own motion, the court of appeals
granted certiorarLlOl Because the suit was filed after the contract of
sale was executed, but before settlement between the Sriuthais and
Broadwater,102 the critical issue before the court of appeals was the
ter paid a $10,000 down payment into an escrow account. See id.
89. See id. at 428, 659 A2d at 303.
90. See id. at 430-31, 659 A2d at 304.
91. See id. at 431, 659 A2d at 304.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.

96. Hereinafter referred to collectively as DeShields.
97. See DeShields, 338 Md. at 440, 659 A2d at 309.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 442, 659 A2d at 309.
101. See id. at 428, 659 A2d at 303.
102. See id. at 439, 659 A2d at 308.
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effect of the executory contract. 103
A. Effect of Executory Contract of Sale Prior to Suit Involving Lis Pendens

DeShields argued that "purchase," in the context of lis pendens,
either referred to the conveyance of the property or possession of
the property by Broadwater, and not to the execution of an executory contract of sale. 104 Rejecting this argument, the trial court ruled
that purchase, as it relates to lis pendens, referred to the "signing of
[an] executory contract."105 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding, following the prevailing rule that purchase occurs
when equitable conversion occurs.l06
Equitable conversion is said to occur when the contract is executed provided that the sale is bona fide, made for valuable consideration, and one that a court would specifically enforce against an
unwilling purchaser. 107 The contract between Broadwater and the
Sriuthais was binding and for valuable consideration. 108 Therefore,
absent notice of the litigation prior to executing the contract, the
elements of equitable conversion were satisfied and barred the application of lis pendens. 109
B.

Actual Notice

Broadwater's interest may have been barred if he had actual or
constructive notice of DeShields's constructive trust suit prior to entering into the contract. 110 "Because lis pendens provides constructive
103. See id.
104. See id. at 440, 659 A.2d at 309. DeShields argued that because legal title passed
when Broadwater came into possession, Broadwater did not purchase the
property until the July 12, 1989 settlement date, three and one-half months after suit was filed. See id.
105. Id. at 440, 659 A.2d at 308-09.
106. See id. at 442, 659 A.2d at 309. The court stated that the majority of jurisdictions "hold ... that lis pendens filed after the execution of the sales contract
does not affect the interest of the contract purchaser." Id. (citations omitted).
107. See id. at 438-39, 659 A.2d at 308-09. DeShields did not dispute that the contract was specifically enforceable at the time the contract was executed. See id.
108. See id. at 440, 659 A.2d at 309. Broadwater contracted to purchase the property for $135,000. See id. at 429, 659 A.2d at 303. The purchase was contingent
upon a title search to confirni the Sriuthais' fee simple title, a survey of the
property, and to confirm a down payment of $10,000 into an escrow account.
See id. Broadwater's attorney had some difficulty acquiring an accurate survey
of the property which delayed closing until July 12, 1989. See id. at 429, 440,
659 A.2d at 303, 309.
109. See id. at 439-42, 659 A.2d at 308-09.
110. See id. at 445, 659 A.2d at 311.
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notice of the equity claimed by the plaintiff, the transferee's actual
notice of that equitable claim prevents that transferee from being a
purchaser in good faith."llI The trial court found that Broadwater
entered into an executory contract almost two months before the
constructive trust suit was filed against the Sriuthais:112 Therefore,
Broadwater did not have constructive notice. l13 Additionally, the
trial court found that when Broadwater entered into the contract of
sale he did not have actual notice that DeShields contemplated suing the Sriuthais or that DeShields claimed any interest in the property.1I4 Several noted factors support this finding.
First, DeShields showed Broadwater a copy of the settlement
agreement requiring DeShields to pay the Sriuthais rent for the
proceeding five years, recognizing the Sriuthais as landlords of the
property.1I5 Second, the court found that the Sriuthais informed
Broadwater that DeShields did not want to purchase the property.1I6
In addition, Broadwater had several conversations with DeShields
prior to settlement on the property, during which DeShields gave
Broadwater no indication that she claimed any interest in the property.117 Thus, the court held that Broadwater did not have actual notice and was a bona fide purchaser for value. liS
C.

Purchaser Made a Party to the Suit

Conversely, the court recognized that DeShields had notice of
Broadwater's claim to the property, and that DeShields deliberately
excluded him as a party by opposing Broadwater's motion to inter111. Id. at 436, 659 A.2d at 306. A purchaser with actual notice of another person's
equitable interest is a mala fide purchaser. See id. (citing Newport Terminals,
Inc. v. Sunset Terminals, Inc., 566 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Or. 1977».
112. See id. at 439, 659 A.2d at 308.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 431, 659 A.2d at 304. The trial court concluded that neither Broadwater or any agent of Broadwater had any knowledge of the suit prior to July
12, 1989. See id. at 432, 659 A.2d at 304.
115. See id. at 431-32, 659 A.2d at 304.
116. See id. at 432, 659 A.2d at 304.
117. See id. Broadwater and DeShields had several conversations. The first was on
January 30, 1989, when Broadwater informed DeShields that he had purchased the property, and the second was within the following two weeks. See
id. DeShields did not claim any interest in the property in either of the conversations. See id. DeShields apparently recognized Broadwater as the new
owner, as is evident by her statement to Broadwater: "You'll be my landlord
and we'll get along." [d.
118. See id.
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vene. 1I9 If, however, DeShields wanted Broadwater to be bound by
the court's judgment, she needed to join Broadwater as a party. 120
DeShields could not rely on lis pendens121 because when property is
transferred prior to the initiation of the action, lis pendens is inapplicable and the rule that the decree of the court binds only those
parties before it applies. 122
D.

Collateral Estoppel and Law of the Case

DeShields's final contention on appeal was that lis pendens was
applicable against Broadwater because the court had denied the
motion to intervene in the case between Jack's and the Sriuthais. 123
DeShields reasoned that the court denied Broadwater's motion to
intervene because lis pendens was applicable. 124 On appeal, the court
rejected this argument because there was no basis for the denial of
the motion to intervene in the record-the denial could have been
based on the motion's timeliness. l25

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

The Only Equitable Holding

Equitable conversion is founded upon the policies of fairness
119. See id. at 447, 659 A.2d at 312. Broadwater moved to intervene, claiming that
he had an interest in the subject matter of the constructive trust suit between
DeShields and the Sriuthais and that his interest was not being adequately
represented. See id. DeShields opposed the motion to intervene, despite her
knowledge that Broadwater claimed an interest in the property prior to the
initiation of the suit. See id. DeShields argued that Broadwater was not a necessary party because her action involved lis pendens. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. The court stated that a person whose interest exists at the commencement of the suit will not be bound by the proceedings unless he is made a
party. See id. at 444, 659 A.2d at 311.
122. See id. at 436, 659 A.2d at 306. The court stated that joining a third-party purchaser as a party to the suit affecting title to that property is simply a recognition that a plaintiff does not rely on lis pendens for the suit. See id. at 445, 659
A.2d at 311.
123. See id. at 447, 659 A.2d at 312. Although the DeShields court held lis pendens inapplicable due to equitable conversion, the opinion did not hold that lis
pendens was inapplicable to a suit involving a constructive trust. See id. However, other jurisdictions have stated that lis pendens is not proper in a suit
praying for constructive trust on real property. See, e.g., Katz v. Banning, 617
N.E.2d 729,733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
124. See DeShields, 338 Md. at 447, 659 A.2d at 312.
125. See id.
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and enforcing contracts that are binding upon both parties. 126
Neither policy is deemed more important than the other. A court
will enforce an executory contract by decreeing specific performance. 127 It would not be equitable to allow a vendor to avoid a contract of sale with a bona fide purchaser when the vendor loses a suit
involving lis pendens, when the same contract would be enforceable
against the purchaser if the vendor prevailed in the suit in an action for specific performance. Both the purchaser and the party filing the suit have important interests to protect. Therefore, the
maxim of "first in time will prevail" is the only equitable solution.

B. Practical Considerations
Practicing lawyers need to be aware of which parties they must
join when a property interest has been acquired prior to the filing
of a lawsuit. 128 Identifying interested parties may be accomplished by
asking a party who is in possession 'of the property before the suit is
filed or by checking land records. However, it may be somewhat
more difficult if a party who has acquired an interest is. not yet in
possession or if the contract of sale is not recorded. The defendant
in a suit affecting title must be asked whether any interest has been
sold or conveyed. If so, the party that has acquired the interest must
be made a party so that they may be bound by the judgment. 129
Once a party, the court must decide whether the plaintiff's interest
is superior to that of the third party purchaser. To convince a court
of this superior right, a plaintiff might argue that the contract is no
longer enforceable under a statutory provision. 130
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See supra notes 3546 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38.
See supra part II(C).
See supra part II(C).
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 10401 (1996). There is a limitation on
the enforcement of recorded land contracts in Maryland.
When the buyer is not in possession of the property, no recorded
contract for the sale of the property is enforceable or constitutes an
encumbrance of the title, as against persons other than the original
parties, unless within five years after the date set out in the recorded
contract for the delivery of the deed, an action or proceeding is commenced to enforce the contract. If no date for the delivery of the
deed is designated in the recorded contract, any action or proceeding shall be commenced within five years after the date when, according to the terms of the recorded contract, the final payment or
installment of the purchase price was required to be paid.
Id.
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Additionally, because cases pending in United States District
Court can have lis pendens effect in Maryland without filing in local
circuit courts the party should search federal court dockets. 131 Thus,
a party perfonning a title search must check both state and federal
dockets. 132
A party that has acquired an interest which is subject to suit involving lis pendens may have both a substantive and a procedural argument. This party may assert that the interest was obtained before
the action was filed. 133 This could be as simple as arguing that an
executory contract of sale, which is valid and binding, was entered
into prior to the date the suit was commenced. l34 However, depending on the particular state's requirements, a party that has acquired
an interest subsequent to a suit may still argue that the suit was not
filed according to the state's statutory requirements and is therefore
ineffective. I35 The attorney must be aware, however, that his client's
actual notice of another's intention to initiate an action involving title to the property will defeat this argument. 136

C.

Maryland s General Assembly Should Codify Lis Pendens

The Maryland legislature should follow the trend established in
forty-six states and enact a lis pendens statute. 137 The statute should
be written to abrogate some of the harsh effects and inadequacies
of lis pendens under the common-law doctrine by requiring that the
action be filed with the land records. \38 Additionally, a statutory provision requiring a prior hearing or other safeguards, such as a bond
requirement, . could protect a property interest from being
131. See Permanent Fin. v. Taro, 71 Md. App. 489, 494, 526 A.2d 611, 613 (1987)
(stating that a suit pending in a federal court would seem to affect a purchaser of land in the same district), cert. granted, 311 Md. 193, 533 A.2d 670
(1987). Some states, such as New York, require an action in federal court to
comply with requirements of state law to have lis pendens effect. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Fox, 544 F. Supp. 542 (D.N.Y 1982).
132. See J. PAUL RIEGER, JR., EXAMINING TITLES TO REAL ESTATE IN MARYLAND 7
(1995). A title abstractor will need to search land records, register of wills
records,· State Department of Taxation records, local court records, federal district court and bankruptcy records and the County Treasurer's/Director of Finance/local "town" tax offices and their records. See ill.
133. See DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 442, 659 A.2d 300, 309 (1995).
134. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
135. See generally supra note 13.
136. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 13.
138. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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clouded. 139
1. Requirement to File an Action in the Land Records
Lis pendens can have harsh effects if a third-party purchaser acting in good faith purchases property pendente lite without actual notice. l40 This problem is compounded in Maryland because lis pendens
is effective once the suit has been filed. 141 The purchaser may obtain constructive notice only by checking the court's docket to find
out if a suit has been filed involving the title to property they wish
to purchase. Checking court dockets when purchasing property is
common. However, the court docket may not provide the relevant
information required to determine the effect that lis pendens has
over the title to the property.142 The legislature should require that
the person filing suit also record the suit with the appropriate land
records office. In addition, all relevant information concerning the
extent of the lis pendens over the property should be filed. 143 These
steps will make it more likely that a purchaser will discover the lis
pendens and its extent before purchasing. l44 This is a minimal inconvenience to the party wishing to file the action as compared to the
harsh effects a purchaser pendente lite, without actual notice or with
inadequate notice, may encounter. 145

2.

Due Process Requirement of Hearing

Although the doctrine of lis pendens is not an actual lien on the
property, it does cloud the title that prevents the effective disposition of the property.l46 A purchaser will be deterred from buying a
139. See supra note 33.
140. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
14l. See Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md. 317, 327-28 (1866); MD. RULE 12-102(a).
When the property is located in a county other than where the action is pending, a certified copy of the pleading must be filed in the county where the
property is located. See MD. RULE 12-102(b).
142. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
143. This should be a requirement because, although lis pendens is not an actual
lien, its effects are much like a lien on the property.
144. The comments to the New York lis pendens statute explain that the recording
requirement is necessary to protect innocent purchasers from unnecessary
hardship arising from difficulty in discovering the pending lawsuit. See N.Y.
ClV. PRAC. L. & R. 6501 cmt. C6501:1 (1980) (stating that the statutory lis
pendens doctrine is derived from the philosophy of recording acts and gives
priority to an innocent purchaser who records the conveyance before judgment, unless the plaintiff has filed a notice of pendency).
145. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
146. See Kukanskis v. Griffith, 430 A.2d 21, 25 (Conn. 1980).
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property interest that is subject to lis pendens. Lis pendens statutes
that do not provide for a prejudgment opportunity to be heard may
be unconstitutional as violative of due process. 147 Many statutes provide safeguards and opportunities to be heard when lis pendens has
been invoked. 148 Maryland has a rule that protects the defendant's
interest in such situations, which probably provides sufficient due
process protection. 149 However, a statute that provides for a hearing
and other possible safeguards, such as bond requirements, may
serve to better protect property from being clouded.

v.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of lis pendens varies from state to state,150 and is
necessary for the administration of justice. 151 Unfortunately, the doctrine has been responsible for harsh results when notice of pending
litigation is not discovered by an innocent purchaser or when a
147. See Levy, supra note 21, at 1076.
Error is most likely when there is no opportunity for a prefiling or
postfiling hearing at which the property owner can challenge the validity of the lis pendens, when few or no statutory grounds for cancellation exist, and when there is no bond requirement available to
protect against damage to the property owner's interests.
Id.
148. See, e.g., COLO. R Cw. P. 105(£)(2) (1996). Colorado's civil procedure rule
provides:
Any interested person may petition the court in the action identified
in the notice of lis pendens for a determination that a judgment on
the issues raised by the pleadings in the pending action will not affect all, or a designated part, of the real property described in the
notice of lis pendens, or a specifically described interest therein. Mter
a hearing on such petition, the court shall make findings of fact and
enter an order setting forth the description of the property as contained in the recorded notice of lis pendens and the description of
the portion thereof or the interest therein, if any, the title to which
will not be affected by judgment on the issues then pending in the
action.
Id. For an extensive discussion on the due process requirement for lis pendens
statutes see generally Levy, supra note 21.
149. See MD. RULE 12-102(c)(1). The rule states: "On motion of a person in interest
and for good cause, the court in the county in which the action is pending
may enter an order terminating the lis pendens in that county or any other
county in which the lis pendens has been created." Id. This allows the defendant who is being sued for an interest in real property to contest the lis
pendens, prelitigation, and avoid a cloud on the title to the property.
150. See supra note 13.
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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defendant's title to property is clouded unnecessarily.152 Purchasers
of real property should be protected to the fullest extent possible
while still preserving the underlying purpose of the lis pendens doctrine. The doctrine's purpose is in no way affected by a statute requiring the notice to be located in the land records or giving a
defendant a prejudgment opportunity to contest the lis pendens.
Over time, the doctrine has evolved in some states,· serving its purpose in a more efficient and equitable manner.153 Maryland, like
other states that continue to rely on the common law or that do
not adequately protect an innocent purchaser or defendant, should
consider codifying the doctrine in order to abrogate some of its
harsh effects.
Christopher J Marchand

152. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
153. See supra part II.

